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THE ICC AT 10 
RICHARD DICKER 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a pleasure to be back at Washington University Law School at the 
invitation of the Whitney Harris Institute. Leila Sadat’s leadership on the 
International Criminal Court over many years has been an inspiration, and 
this conference is the latest demonstration of her vision. 
As many of you know, in ten years the International Criminal Court 
has opened investigations in seven different country situations. It is worth 
noting that the Court has issued arrest warrants against a sitting head of 
state and a minister of defense. It is conducting proceedings against a 
former head of state, a former vice president, and several presidential 
candidates. Certainly, 15 years ago when we left the FAO Building in 
Rome in the early morning hours of July 18, 1998, a court with this 
extensive docket would have seemed like science fiction. The ICC has 
succeeded in heightening expectations for justice, and it has become the 
address for justice when the national authorities fail to do their job 
prosecuting the most serious crimes. 
Not surprisingly, given the Court’s daunting mandate, there have been 
problems. As strong supporter of the ICC, I believe that when there are 
shortcomings in implementing its mandate, it is important to identify those 
in a principled and constructive manner to assist the court in doing better. 
As it begins its second decade, all parts of the Rome Statute system, 
including court officials in all organs, states parties individually and 
collectively as the Assembly of States Parties, and civil society need to 
“up our game.” Challenges the ICC has faced so far include the slow pace 
of the first and only completed trial; the difficulty of the court making its 
proceedings relevant in the communities most affected by the crimes 
thousands of miles from The Hague; flaws in prosecutorial strategy in 
investigating and selecting cases; and most recently, intense budget 
pressure from the largest paying states parties. Some of these problems 
flow from the court’s daunting mandate, while others are more self-
inflicted injuries. 
I want to focus on a fundamental problem—specifically, the 
intersection of the court’s limited jurisdictional reach with the unevenness 
of the political terrain on which it carries out it judicial mission. By 
unevenness I mean the reality that the leaders of more powerful states and 
those they protect elsewhere are so much less vulnerable to ICC 
prosecutions than the leaders of smaller, weaker states. In other words, the 
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Court’s writ does not apply equally to all. Unfortunately, the ICC has yet 
to realize the potential to minimize unevenness in accountability and this 
is a problem. Court critics use that failing to condemn it harshly and, I 
believe, unfairly. I think the roots of this failure need to be clearly 
understood in order to change it. 
I. THE ANALYSIS 
In part, the shortcoming lies in the jurisdictional bases of the Rome 
Statute itself. At the Rome Diplomatic Conference, negotiators created a 
conservative consent-based jurisdictional regime that left the potential for 
large gaps in the court’s reach, and those gaps have made themselves 
apparent in practice over the ICC’s first decade. The court’s jurisdictional 
infrastructure is rooted in very traditional international law principles. Its 
authority is based on a regime of state consent that is fully respectful of 
national sovereignty. For the court to open an investigation, either the 
country where the alleged crimes occurred or the country of nationality of 
the accused must be a party to the Rome Statute. In addition, consistent 
with its consent-based structure, a state that is not a party can declare its 
acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction. 
Not surprisingly, the most lawless states have shielded themselves by 
not ratifying. Iran, Sudan, Syria, Pakistan, Burma, North Korea and Sri 
Lanka have not joined. And three of the world’s most powerful nations—
the US, China and Russia—have remained outside as non-states parties.  
II. THE EXCEPTIONS 
There are, however, two exceptions to the Rome Statute’s consent 
structure. I am going to focus on the second of these two exceptions, 
referrals by the Security Council, but it’s worth saying a word about the 
first exception. This comes into play where a national of a non-state party 
is alleged to have committed Rome Statute crimes on the territory of a 
state party. For the U.S. government, the prospect of an American citizen 
being tried by a “foreign judge” at the ICC generated intense US 
government opposition before and during the negotiations in Rome. This 
became the peg for the United States’ frequent demand for an “ironclad 
guarantee” that no US citizen would ever appear before the court. This 
potential for criminal liability was a significant factor in the US 
delegation’s vote against the treaty at the end of the Diplomatic 
Conference and the basis of Washington’s refusal to consider joining ever 
since.  
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The second exception involves the role of the United Nations Security 
Council. This departure from the statute’s overarching consent regime 
authorizes the Council, acting under its authority to maintain international 
peace and security, to refer the situation in a non-state party to the court. 
While Security Council referrals extend in a positive way the court’s 
authority to victims of mass atrocities where it would otherwise be barred, 
Council referrals also mirror the underlying unevenness, and this authority 
(as well as the authority to suspend ICC proceedings for a year) has 
become a source of controversy. In the eyes of some, it casts a political 
taint on the court’s subsequent investigations. 
It’s important to note that when a state party refers a situation to the 
court, there is also the danger of interference by that state political actor. 
With both these “triggers,” the court’s prosecutor and judges have to use 
their independent judgment in applying the statute’s provisions to the facts 
of the referred situation.  
III. THE P5 ROLE  
Unevenness and the danger of political instrumentalization is 
compounded by the dominance of the council’s five permanent 
members—the world’s most powerful states. The unevenness is rooted in 
the underlying disparity of economic, political, and military power. While 
there are certainly important distinctions between the US, Russia, and 
China, none of them have joined the court. Through their non-ratification 
and veto power, they have insulated themselves from the ICC. These three 
have also shielded the leaders of certain “client states.” While the Security 
Council has referred Sudan over the situation in Darfur and Libya to the 
ICC, Russia has rendered Bashar al-Assad immune from ICC prosecution. 
Of course, the list of Security Council-guaranteed “accountability-free 
zones” extends further to include US ally Israel and Sri Lanka which is 
protected by China.  
The resulting selectivity scars the global terrain on which the ICC 
works with an ugly double standard, which drains the Court’s legitimacy. 
All too often the Court is blamed for the limited jurisdictional authority 
that the states negotiating in Rome were willing to confer on it. The ICC’s 
patchy and selective coverage has become evident as the Court has 
proceeded with its work over the past decade. This has fed criticism from 
different quarters—some disingenuous, some grounded in genuine 
frustration.   
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IV. STEPS GOING FORWARD 
What can be done to change or at least minimize this? Because of its 
deep roots, unevenness will not lend itself to quick change. We have to 
play the long game here, but that said, we need to be in the game and work 
smartly to change it. This has several components. 
A. Assert Article 12(3) Acceptance of Court Jurisdiction  
States parties can urge countries in transition from armed conflict or 
repressive rule to assert a declaration accepting the court’s jurisdiction. 
Cote D’Ivoire did this both under Laurent Mbagbo (2003) and twice under 
the current president, Alisane Ouattra (2010, 2011). The Palestinian 
Authority attempted this, though Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo demurred. 
These declarations would broaden the court’s reach and send a strong 
symbolic signal on behalf of the rule of law and the court. An ad hoc 
acceptance would not take the place of ratification. Rather it would be an 
immediate measure to assert the rule of law pending the entry into force of 
an instrument of ratification. 
B. Strategic Moves to Increase Ratification  
States parties should press strategically to increase the number of ICC 
states parties. This too would extend the court’s reach and could heighten 
pressure on selected non-states parties to accede to the Rome Statute as 
good state practice. While it will not be easy to go far beyond the current 
122 states parties, progress on strategically important states would be 
valuable, especially in regions where ratification has been so low: the 
Middle East and North Africa, as well as Southeast Asia.  
C. At the United Nations  
At the UN, there have been some noteworthy developments. On 
October 17, 2012 Guatemala, as Security Council President, convened an 
open thematic debate at the Council on the relationship between the 
Security Council and the International Criminal Court. This was the first 
time in ten years that the Security Council had discussed its relationship 
with the Court in general terms as distinct from the Prosecutor’s twice-
yearly reports on Darfur and Libya. 
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This initiative has important potential to: 
i. Criticize the double standard in the Council’s very selective and 
inconsistent approach to accountability and ICC referrals  
and  
ii. Bolster diplomatic support for the Court from its states parties at 
a high profile political forum. 
ICC state parties weighed in with serious, thoughtful interventions that 
were substantively focused and contained concrete proposals laying a 
basis for moving forward. Several themes emerged:  
• The need for greater coherence if not consistency in decisions 
on referrals; 
• The call for more cooperation following any future referrals, the 
view that a referral is only the beginning, criticism of the lack of 
back up support by the Council regarding arrests and judicial 
findings of noncooperation; 
• Calls for UN funding on future referrals since these crimes are 
concern to the international community and the UN as a whole, 
and not just the 121 ICC states parties; 
• Some, but not all, called to end the exemptions for nationals of 
non states parties contained in both SC referrals; 
• Some called for a caucus of states parties on and off the 
Council;  
• Some called for the debate to be more than a one-off event and 
recommended more of a dialogue and a Council Working Group 
to deal with referrals. 
With three Russian and Chinese vetoes of Security Council resolutions 
that would have imposed sanctions and travel bans on selected Syrian 
leaders, the slope for change at the council has become steeper. In 
addition, Rwanda, which joined the council as an elected member on 
January 1, 2013, has brought a relentlessly regressive approach to council 
negotiations referencing the ICC. Given Kigali’s active and extensive 
support for the M23 rebel group responsible for widespread atrocities in 
eastern Congo, Rwanda may be acting out of ample self-interest in 
denigrating an international court before which there is potential criminal 
liability. Taken together, these factors have made the landscape for change 
on accountability and the ICC at the Security Council more difficult. 
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On the positive side, 23 UN member states representing an interesting 
regional diversity have launched a new group—Accountability, Coherence 
and Transparency [ACT]. ACT’s raison d’etre is reforming the working 
methods of the Security Council with a specific cluster devoted to 
accountability and the ICC. 
On this more difficult landscape, the challenge for ICC member states 
is to identify and achieve key steps that can maintain momentum. These 
could include: 
i. Close, ongoing coordination among ICC states parties on the 
Security Council regarding accountability issues, possible 
referrals and follow up after referrals; 
ii. ICC states parties not on the council, through ACT or other 
organizational vehicles, finding ways to take and exert 
increasing ownership and responsibility for ICC issues; 
iii. Convening a second Open Debate on the Council-Court 
relationship; 
iv. Obtaining Council response to the ICC judicial findings of non 
cooperation on the Darfur referral;  
v. Moving ICC cooperation matters arising from referral 
resolutions to an informal Security Council Working Group 
such as exists for the ad hoc tribunals.  
CONCLUSION 
There is tension between the Court’s mandate to apply the norms of 
international criminal justice, on the one hand, and the ICC’s limited 
jurisdictional on the other hand. This tension is exacerbated by the 
Security Council’s essential role as a political body. The court is not 
responsible for the latter, but is certainly affected by it. There is no silver 
bullet solution to quickly resolve the problem. The key now is to realize 
short-term goals towards the longer term objectives. Addressing this in the 
court’s second decade will be crucial to the ICC’s ability to fulfill its 
mandate to limit impunity for the most serious crimes.  
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